Abstract. In practice, many manufacturers o er trade promotion to retailers to induce demand. It is also common for a retailer to sell products of competing manufacturers. This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain where two manufacturers provide a trade promotion to a retailer, and the retailer faces uncertain and price-dependent demand. In the model, the manufacturers determine wholesale prices and the retailer determines retail price and order quantity to maximize their own pro ts. An algorithm based on non-linear optimization is provided to solve the problem. We compare three trade promotions under brand competition: o -invoice, scan-back, and buy-back policies, and discuss the e ects of trade promotions on decisions and pro ts. The results indicate that the manufacturers and retailer prefer the buy-back policy over the o -invoice and scan-back policies. The retailer's pro t will increase and the manufacturers' pro ts will decrease as the brand substitution e ect increases. Also, the manufacturers will raise their wholesale prices, but the retailer will reduce the retail price and order quantity when the brand substitution rate increases.
Introduction
Price is one of the major strategy decision variables that a company controls. Pricing decisions a ect not only the number of sales a company makes, but also how much money it earns. In practice, determining the optimal price to maximize the company's pro t under demand uncertainty is challenging for managers. In academia, pricing is incorporated into the inventory models under di erent situations. Making price and inventory decisions simultaneously is becoming an important issue in today's business.
Tsao et al. [1] and Modak et al. [2] emphasized the importance of integrated pricing and lot-size decisionmaking. Ouyang et al. [3] developed an optimization approach for joint pricing and ordering problem under order-size dependent trade credit. Sajadieh and Jokar. [4] made the optimal pricing, ordering, and shipment decisions in a two-stage supply chain with pricesensitive demand. Sana [5] developed stochastic EOQ model with random sales price. Cai et al. [6] studied the optimal pricing and ordering with partial lost sales in two-stage supply chains. Sana [7] determined the optimal production rate, order quantity, number of shipments with equal sizes. Hsieh et al. [8] considered multiple manufacturers and a common retailer in a supply chain facing uncertain demand. Maihami and Karimi [9] optimized the pricing and replenishment policy for non-instantaneous deteriorating items with stochastic demand and promotional e orts. Modak et al. [10] explored channel coordination and pro t division issues of a manufacturer-distributer-duopolistic retailers supply chain. Panda et al. [11] and Modak et al. [12] considered joint decisions in dual-channel supply chains.
Trade promotions are designed to in uence endcustomer demand by providing various inducements from manufacturers to retailers, which is a crucial factor in achieving volume and pro table growth. In practice, many manufacturers o er trade promotion to retailers to induce demand. Trade promotions account for over 60% of manufacturer's marketing budgets for packaged goods [13] and for an unprecedented 18.01% of U.S. manufacturers' gross sales in 2010 [14] . Two commonly used trade promotions are o -invoice and scan-back policies. For the o -invoice policy, manufacturers o er discounts on the order quantity sold to retailers. For the scan-back policy, manufacturers o er discounts on the actual quantity that retailers sell to end customers. Due to the existence of trade promotion, it is important to consider trade promotions when developing two-echelon supply chain models.
In addition, buy-back is another commonly incentive policy in which a retailer is allowed to return unsold products to the manufacturer at an agreed price. For example, a buy-back agreement in a sales contract may require the builder-seller to buy the property back, if the buyer-occupant is transferred by his company within six months; it is commonly used in the publishing, home video, newspaper, and apparel industries. Blockbuster and its suppliers are a famous example to use buy-back policy to increase their revenues. Several studies considered the buy-back policy as a coordination contract to achieve channel coordination [15] [16] [17] [18] . In our research, we consider it as a trade promotion policy and compare it with oinvoice and scan-back policies.
It is common for a retailer to sell products of competing manufacturers. A typical example is Procter & Gamble's Crest toothpaste versus Colgate-Palmolive's Colgate toothpaste at a supermarket [19] . These rms want to know which trade promotion is best for them under brand competition and demand uncertainty. Thereby, we also consider the competition that arises because of brand substitution. This means that some customers may switch to another brand if their preferred brand is out-of-stock. Demand uncertainty is the major reason to cause a company to experience outof-stock event. In practice, customer demand can never be forecasted exactly. Treating consumer demand as uncertain and applying probability theory to help companies make decisions are important. Sana and Goyal [20] considered the stochastic demand with leadtime dependent partial backlogging. In this paper, we consider the pricing and ordering simultaneously under trade promotion, brand competition, and demand uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The models and the solution approach are presented in Section 2. In Section 3, the numerical analysis is conducted to get the managerial insights. Section 4 presents conclusions on managerial implications.
Models
In this paper, we use the following notations:
: Retailer's pro t in the buy-back case. This paper considers that the brand competition arises because of brand substitution. That is, some customers may switch to another brand if their preferred brand is in shortage. We model a customer's willingness to buy another brand, when his preferred brand is out-of-stock by the parameter (i.e., the rate of brand substitution). In practice, factors, such as brand loyalty and searching cost, could determine the value . In our models, two manufacturers (namely, manufacturer i and manufacturer j) simultaneously o er the same trade promotion to the retailer. When the supply exceeds the demand in the channel of manufacturer i (channel i), and shortages take place in channel j, some customers in channel j will shift to channel i. We develop three models for o -invoice, scan-back, and buy-back trade promotion policies. We assume symmetric prices at the wholesale and retailer levels and trade promotions in each model to compare the three di erent trade promotions under brand competition.
When the o -invoice policy is used, the trade promotion discount, , is o ered by the manufacturer as a price reduction on the normal price of goods. To consider the demand shifting from channel j to channel i, we should compare two quantities. The rst quantity is:
which is the expected amount of customer demand willing to shift from channel j to channel i. The second quantity is:
which is the expected surplus supply quantity in channel i. When:
the expected demand shift is: For buy-back policy, the retailer is allowed to return unsold products to the manufacturer at an agreed price (i.e., buy-back policy). In this case, the expected demand shifting from channel j to channel i is: To solve the retailer's piecewise non-linear problem, we rst determine the maximal pro t 1 R for Case 1 and 2 r for Case 2. Then, the optimal decisions are chosen for the maximal pro t R , i.e. R = maxf 1 R ; 2 R g.
For each model (trade promotion policy), the manufacturers determine the optimal wholesale prices, and the retailer determines the optimal retail price and order quantity to maximize their own pro ts. We use the following solution procedure to solve the problem. To determine the optimal wholesale price, we start with an initial guess of wholesale price. Given the wholesale price, the retailer determines the optimal retail prices and order quantities to maximize his pro t for di erent brands. Consequently, the manufacturer's pro t can be calculated. Then, we choose an error tolerance and set a new wholesale price as the sum of the original wholesale price and the error tolerance. Given the new wholesale price, the optimal retail prices and order quantities for di erent brands can be determined. We can also compute the manufacturer's pro t based on the new wholesale price. If the manufacturer's pro t with the new wholesale price is larger than that with the original wholesale price, set another new wholesale price (the sum of the new wholesale price and the error tolerance) and determine retailer's decisions and manufacturer's pro ts. Otherwise, set another new wholesale price to be the value of subtracting the error tolerance from the new wholesale price and determine retailer's decisions and manufacturer's pro ts. Repeat these processes until the manufacturer's pro t decreases for the rst time. Thus, we can determine the optimal wholesale prices, retail prices, and order quantities under brand competition. The following algorithm shows the solving process. Algorithm -Step 1. Set an initial guess for wholesale price, W 0 , and an error tolerance ".
-Step 2. Determine P 0 and Q 0 to maximize R (P 0 ; Q 0 jW 0 ).
-Step 3. Let W k=1 = W 0 + ", determine P k=1 and Q k=1 to maximize R (P 1 ; Q 1 jW 1 ). -Step 4. If M (P 1 ; Q 1 jW 1 ) M (P 0 ; Q 0 jW 0 ), go to
Step 5; otherwise, go to Step 6.
-Step 5.
-Step 5.1. Let W k+1 = W k + ", determine P K+1
and Q k+1 to maximize R (P k+1 ; Q k+1 jW k+1 ).
-Step 5.2. If:
M (P k+1 ; Q k+1 jW k+1 ) (P k ; Q k jW k );
let: k = k + 1 and go to Step 5.1; otherwise, set: W = W k ; P = P k ; Q = Q k ; M = M (jW k ; P k ; Q k ); and: R = R (jW k ; P k ; Q k ); and then stop.
-Step 6.
-Step 6.1. Let W k+1 = W k ", determine P k+1 and Q K+1 to maximize R (P k+1 ; Q k+1 jW k+1 ).
-Step 6.2. If: M (P k+1 ; Q k+1 jW k+1 ) M (P k ; Q k jW k ); let k = k + 1 and go to Step 6.1; Otherwise, set: W = W k ; P = P k ; Q = Q k; M = M (jW k ; P k ; Q k ) and: R = R (jW k ; P k ; Q k ) and then stop.
Numerical analysis
In this section, we conduct a numerical analysis to realize the e ectiveness of each trade promotion, and how trade promotion and substitution rate a ect decisions and pro ts. Tables 1 to 3 show the manufacturers' and retailer's decisions and pro ts with di erent substitution rate under the three trade promotions. We analyze the e ect of substitution rate, , on the results. We assume symmetric wholesale prices, retail prices, and order quantity in order to compare the three trade promotions (o -invoice, scan-back, and buy-back) directly. We have the following numerical results: 1. For the three trade promotion policies, when the substitution rate, , increases, the wholesale price and retailer's pro t will increase, but the retail price, order quantity, and manufacturer pro t will decrease. Increasing brand substitution e ect means that customers are willing to buy another brand when they cannot nd their preferred brand in the same retail store. Therefore, the retailer's pro t will increase as brand substitution e ect increases. It is reasonable for a retailer to decrease order quantities for each brand, because customers will buy another brand in the same store if their preferred brand is in shortage; 2. For the o -invoice policy, when the trade promotion discount increases, the wholesale price will increase; but the retail price, order quantity, manufacturer's pro t, and retailer's pro t will not change. For the scan-back policy, when the trade promotion discount increases, the wholesale price will increase; but the retail price, order quantity, manufacturer pro t, and retailer pro t will decrease. For the buy-back policy, when the trade promotion discount increases, the wholesale price will increase; but the retail price, order quantity, manufacturer pro t, and retailer pro t will increase; 3. Compare the three trade promotion policies, wholesale price is the lowest; retail price and order quantity are the highest under the buy-back policy. Wholesale price is the highest under the o -invoice policy; retail price and order quantity are the lowest under the scan-back policy. Pro ts of the manufacturer and retailer are the highest in the buy-back policy. Actually, pro ts of the manufacturer and retailer are concave as the buy-back price. Take = 0:15 as an example, Figure 1 shows the pro ts under di erent trade promotions. It shows that the pro ts of both the manufacturer and retailer under the buy-back policy are higher than those under the o -invoice and scan-back policies, when the buyback price is determined within an appropriative range.
Conclusion
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain where two competing manufacturers sell products to a single retailer and the retailer sells products to end customers. The manufacturers provide trade promotions to a retailer, and the retailer faces uncertain and pricedependent end customer demand. The objective is to determine the optimal wholesale prices to maximize manufacturers' pro ts and the optimal retail price and order quantity to maximize retailer's pro t. An algorithm is provided to solve the problem. We consider three trade promotions (o -invoice, scan-back, and buy-back) and compare their performances. The results indicate that the manufacturers and retailers prefer the buy-back policy over the o -invoice and scanback policies under brand competition and demand uncertainty. The wholesale prices and retailer's pro t will increase, but the retail price, order quantity, and manufacturers' pro ts will decrease as the brand substitution e ect increases. This study also shows that wholesale price is the lowest; retail price and order quantity are the highest in buy-back policy. Perhaps surprisingly, retail price and order quantity will decrease as scan-back trade promotion discount increases; they will remain unchanged as o -invoice trade promotion discount increases; they will increase as buy-back trade promotion discount increases.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, based on our research, this is the rst study to consider trade promotions under brand competition and demand uncertainty. We also made the optimal pricing and ordering decisions for manufacturers and retailers in a two-echelon supply chain. A solution approach was proposed for solving the resulting non-linear programs in this study. Third, we conducted numerical studies to demonstrate the solution procedures and determined the e ects of the relevant model parameters on manufacturers' and retailer's decisions and pro ts. The results and the modeling approach are useful references for managerial decisions. Suggestions for further research are provided as follows: First, the model can be extended to consider both brand and retailer competitions. Second, it should be discussed how other trade promotions a ect the channel behavior would be also worthwhile.
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